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In a series of articles on social science, Charles Taylor has repeatedly argued 
the futility of naturalist model in social sciences and emphasized the importance of 
interpretation in studying the human sciences. As is well known, Taylor's 
interpretivist position is prominent and distinguished from other interpretivists' 
claims in that he criticizes the naturalist view and defends his own interpretivism 
by adhering to the common consciousness in hermeneutic tradition. 
In a sense, however, Taylor goes beyond this hermeneutic tradition. 
Historically, hermeneutic tactics had been developed in demand for interpreting old 
traditionary texts in the first place, and then used for understanding historical world 
by German philosophers such as Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer. But what 
Taylor has in prospect is more ambitious. Taylor thinks that hermeneutics can 
serve the demand for understanding different cultures in the cross-cultural studies 
like anthropology. Moreover, he recently goes as far as to ground his political 
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claim of "multiculturalism" on an idea in hermeneutics.1 
But can hermeneutics really serve this demand? Does hermeneutics have 
broad enough shoulders to take on these tasks? In this paper I try to explain how 
hermeneutics originally attains understanding and to consider whether, and on what 
conditions, hermeneutics can serve the cross-cultural studies. I expect that this 
inquiry will guide us to the conclusion that though hermeneutics can be fruitful for 
understanding different cultures, there remains a serious problem which is unique 
to cross-cultural studies. 
 
II 
Among the various kinds of hermeneutics, it is obvious that Taylor's 
interpretivist view heavily depends on Hans-Georg Gadamer's “Philosophical 
Hermeneutics”, because Taylor sometimes refers to the Gadamer's conception of 
the “fusion of horizons” and proclaims explicitly that he owes a great deal to this 
conception. So it is best to start with an outline of Gadamer's Philosophical 
Hermeneutics in Truth and Method (hereafter, TM)2. 
                                                
1 Cf. Charles Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73. In p. 67, 
Taylor cites H.-G. Gadamer's notion of the "fusion of horizons," which I will explain in detail 
later. 
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 1, Wahrheit und Methode, Grundzüge einer 
philosophischen Hermeneutik, 5. Auflage (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1986). English translation: 
Truth and Method, second revised edition, translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2000). All quotations will be taken from this English 
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Gadamer shares the same beliefs as the rest of the hermeneutic tradition in part. 
On the one hand, he admits that "the goal of all attempts to reach an understanding 
is agreement concerning subject matter" and that "the task of hermeneutics has 
always been to establish agreement where there was none or where it had been 
disturbed in some way." 3  At this point he places himself in line with the 
hermeneutic tradition. But on the other hand, Gadamer thinks that the 
understanding lies originally in dialogue, and describes the task of hermeneutics as 
"entering into dialogue with text" (ein In-das-Gesprächkommen mit dem Text)4. 
Then what does he mean by "entering into dialogue with text"? How does Gadamer 
think we can get to understanding through this dialogue? 
But we cannot hasten to answer the questions, for Gadamer doesn't offer a 
particular methodology for understanding, which can only be acknowledged 
epistemologically as valid. Rather, Gadamer is trying to ground the epistemological 
problem of hermeneutics on the ontological argument about the nature of man. So 
we should take time and follow his line of thought. 
Gadamer claims that we are certain to be affected by the prejudices of our age, 
some of which have been formed and preserved as authorities in the stream of 
tradition. Even the Enlightenment, which advocates freedom from prejudices and 
the subjection of all authorities to reason, is no exception, for the Enlightenment's 
                                                                                                                                                       
translation. All references to the original German text will follow the references to the English 
translation, in brackets like [WM, p. ．．．]. 
3 TM, p. 292 [WM, p. 297]. 
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assumption that our prejudices can be dissolved and enlightened is a prejudice in 
itself. So our understanding is not only influenced by the reason in the 
Enlightenment's sense, but also by the authorities handed down to our age through 
tradition. But all of these prejudices may not guide us to the correct understanding. 
Perhaps some of them will hinder our way to the truth. Hence Gadamer formulates 
the most basic epistemological problem of hermeneutics as follows: "what is the 
ground of the legitimacy of prejudices? What distinguishes legitimate prejudices 
from the countless others which it is the undeniable task of critical reason to 
overcome?"5 
It seems that the Enlightenment answers these questions, when it claims that 
our faith in authorities is the cause of misunderstanding, and that we could only 
capture the truth in the light of reason. On the contrary, Gadamer tries to rescue the 
authorities as the legitimate prejudice for understanding. He claims that "if the 
prestige of authority displaces one's own judgement [which is made in the light of 
reason], ．．． this does not preclude its being a source of truth"6. But why does 
Gadamer think the authorities can be the legitimate prejudice? Here we can see 
how the epistemological problem of hermeneutics is grounded on the ontological 
claim, which has its origin in Heidegger. This ontological claim can be divided into 
two factors. 
First, there is an ontological turn of understanding. Gadamer defines some 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 TM, p. 368 [WM, p. 374]. 
5 TM, p. 277 [WM, p. 281-2]. 
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conditions we must follow when we try to understand text. In the first place, unless 
we assume that the text constitutes a unity of meaning, and so unless we assume 
that what the author says should be the complete truth, we cannot start to 
understand the text. Gadamer calls these assumptions "the fore-conception of 
completeness" (Vorbegriff der Vollkommenheit), and this is "a formal condition of 
all understanding"7. But at the same time, unless we have some anticipation of 
meaning, such unity of meaning cannot be constituted. Hence, before we 
understand the text there must be a "fore-understanding, which comes from being 
concerned with the same subject" (das Vorverständnis, das im Zu-tun-haben mit 
der gleichen Sache entspringt). This is called "the most basic of all hermeneutic 
preconditions"8. But then, how can we get the fore-understanding? How can it be 
shown that we are concerned with the same subject as the text? 
There appears the second ontological factor in the answer to this question, for 
Gadamer derives the answer from the fact that we belong to a tradition. As 
historical and finite beings we belong to a tradition, and to "belong to a tradition" 
(die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Tradition) means that there exist some "commonality 
of fundamental, enabling prejudices" throughout the tradition9. Hence as long as 
we belong to the same tradition as the text, we can share the same prejudices with 
the text. And if so, we are familiar with the text to the extent that there is the 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 TM, p. 279 [WM, p. 283]. 
7 TM, p. 293-4 [WM, p. 299]. 
8 TM, p. 294 [WM, p. 299]. 
9 TM, p. 295 [WM, p. 300]. 
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commonality of prejudices. "Hermeneutics must start from the position that a 
person seeking to understand something has a bond to the subject matter that 
comes into language through the traditional text and has, or acquires, a connection 
with the tradition from which the text speaks."10 
But this is not the end of the story, for we cannot have a complete bond to the 
subject matter just because we belong to the same tradition. The language and story 
that the text speaks to us remains more or less strange to us, for the stream of 
tradition must have been altered by the prejudices of each age in the past. We can't 
directly get in touch with the old language and story. And here we can see why 
Gadamer opposes the Enlightenment's view of the prejudices. It is clear that we 
cannot try to understand a text only in terms of the prejudices of our own age, 
without taking the strangeness of the text into account. If we tried, we would end 
up ignoring the strangeness and disregarding what the text originally wanted to say. 
This would be far from understanding the text. 
But there is another way in which we seem to be able to distinguish the 
legitimate prejudices from the illegitimate. It is called "historical objectivism." This 
objectivism emphasizes the strangeness which is completely neglected in the above 
case, and it tries to reproduce the meaning of a historical text as it stood when it 
was written. Hence this objectivism assumes that in order to understand historical 
texts we must place ourselves into the author's situation, transpose ourselves into 
the spirit of age, think with its ideas and its thoughts, not with our own, and thus 
                                                
10 TM, p. 295 [WM, p. 300]. 
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advance toward historical objectivity. To put it shortly, It assumes that 
understanding consists in the accurate reproduction of meaning. 
But Gadamer doesn't adopt this methodology, either. He criticizes it by 
arguing that the assumption behind it is naive in the point that it forgets our own 
historicity. While this objectivism is right in being aware of the strangeness, it 
neglects the fact that we are affected by the prejudices of our own age and that 
"every age has to understand a transmitted text in its own way"11.  
Thus neither the prejudices of our age nor the prejudices reproduced by the 
method of historical objectivism alone can be the legitimate prejudices for 
understanding. While the former forgets the strangeness of the text, the latter 
forgets the fact that we are historical and finite beings. Indeed, the text is situated 
in between familiarity and strangeness to us. But if that is the case, how else can 
we gain the legitimate prejudices for understanding? 
According to Gadamer, temporal distance helps us to distinguish the true 
prejudices by which we understand, from the false ones by which we 
misunderstand. It is true that temporal distance has been thought of as a prevention 
against understanding and has "remained entirely peripheral in previous 
hermeneutics"12. But, as already mentioned, it cannot be denied that we are 
historical and finite beings, and that we are always affected by the prejudices which 
are constantly operating unnoticed. And then, as long as we are not aware of the 
                                                
11 TM, p. 296 [WM, p. 301]. 
12  ibid. 
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prejudices, we can't distinguish the true ones from the false ones. But when we start 
understanding the traditional text on the assumption that what the author says 
should be the complete truth, our prejudices will be put at risk by facing the 
unintelligible meanings of the texts. And so once we encounter the traditional texts, 
which are so remote from us that we cannot easily understand them, the hidden 
prejudices of ours will be provoked to reveal. 
We cannot distinguish the legitimate prejudices from the illegitimate ones 
unless we suspend our own prejudices. But we cannot suspend our own prejudices 
unless our prejudices are put at risk, and it is when we come across something 
strange and alien to us that we sincerely feel that our prejudices are at risk. Unless 
we sincerely listen to the claim to truth which something strange and alien lays, we 
remain contaminated by our own prejudices. Thus, the "first condition of 
hermeneutics" is formulated as follows: "understanding begins ．．． when 
something addresses us" (Das erste, womit das Verstehens beginnt, ist, ．．．, daß 
etwas uns anspricht)13.  
Now we can answer the question raised earlier in this section, that is, how 
does Gadamer think we will attain understanding by "entering into the dialogue 
with text"? First, the subject matter of the text addresses us. And as long as we 
belong to a tradition, we may have some bond to the subject matter. So we try to 
understand what it means in terms of the prejudices of our age. But then, perhaps 
we find it unintelligible for us. What shall we do next? 
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The historical objectivists mistakenly think that they can completely put 
themselves into the author's situation and see the traditional text in its original 
perspective, that is, within its own historical horizon. But as long as we are 
historical and finite beings, we cannot get away from the prejudices of our age and 
our own horizon. Even when we think we are completely put into the horizon of 
the text, we are not actually put into the author's shoes. Rather, by putting ourselves 
into the author's position we "become aware of the otherness, the indissoluble 
individuality of the other person"14.  
Then we can describe the next step as follows: we have just failed to grasp the 
meaning of the text, and our own prejudices have been put at risk. Now we must 
guard against overhastily assimilating the past to our own expectations of meaning, 
as if there were independent historical horizons and we could jump into them freely. 
We must be aware of the particularity of the past and check our own prejudices. 
And we go on to revise our expectations of meaning and try to understand the text 
again and again. Thus, understanding is "rising to a higher universality that 
overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other."15 To cite the 
famous phrase, "understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly 
existing by themselves." (Vielmehr ist Verstehen immer der Vorgang der 
Verschmelzung solcher vermeintlich für sich seiender Horizonte.)16 
                                                                                                                                                       
13 TM, p. 299 [WM, p. 304]. 
14 TM, p. 305 [WM, p. 310]. 
15 TM, p. 305 [WM, p. 310]. 





Now let us turn to the Taylor's case. Among the many articles written by 
Taylor, "Understanding and Ethnocentricity17"(hereafter, UE) is most approachable 
for us, when it comes to the relationship between hermeneutics and cross-cultural 
studies. So in this paper I will deal with this article and explain how he applies the 
idea of hermeneutics to cross-cultural studies. 
In this article Taylor criticizes two representative views in the philosophy of 
social science and defends his own interpretivist position. The point at issue 
throughout the argument is the adequate language for cross-cultural studies. 
The first enemy of Taylor is the naturalist view. Naturalists try to describe the 
actions and practices in different cultures without recourse to interpretation. They 
identify them in an allegedly neutral scientific language. But then, according to 
Taylor, they fall into ethnocentrism as a result of ignoring self-description of the 
agents altogether. While all actions and cultural practices must be meaningful in 
terms of the agents' self-description, that is, a vision of the agents and their society, 
naturalists will not acknowledge the meaning of those actions and practices on the 
assumption that they can recognize them in their own allegedly neutral terms. 
The second enemy is one of the interpretivist position represented by Peter 
                                                
17 Charles Taylor, "Understanding and Ethnocentricity," in Philosophy and Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 116-133. 
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Winch. Contrary to the naturalist view, Winch takes the self-description of agents 
with ultimate seriousness. He argues that we must understand different cultures in 
their own terms, guarding against the error of misunderstanding one according to 
the categories of another. And as long as he defends the significance of 
interpretation and self-description of agents, Winch is not the enemy but the ally of 
Taylor. But Taylor opposes Winch's view by arguing that Winch misconstrues 
interpretation as adopting the agent's point of view. If we try to explain each 
culture or society in its own terms alone, cross-cultural studies will be so 
'incorrigible' that they will rule out the account which shows the culture up as 
wrong or confused. 
Thus, according to Taylor, if we adopt the naturalist view on the one hand, the 
language of cross-cultural studies will become arrogantly ethnocentric. But if we 
adopt the Winch's view on the other hand, the language will become incorrigible. 
Facing this dilemma, we need an alternative language which does not fall into 
either incorrigibility or ethnocentricity. From this point of view, Taylor offers the 
idea of this alternative language, which is called "a language of perspicuous 
contrast". Taylor characterizes this language as follows: 
 
"．．．[T]he adequate language in which we can understand another society is not our 
language of understanding, or theirs, but rather what one could call a language of 
perspicuous contrast. This would be a language in which we could formulate both their 
way of life and ours as alternative possibilities in relation to some human constants at 
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work in both. It would be a language in which the possible human variations would be so 
formulated that both our form of life and theirs could be perspicuously described as 
alternative such variations. Such a language of contrast might show their language of 
understanding to be distorted or inadequate in some respects, or it might show ours to be 
so (in which case, we might find that understanding them leads to an alteration of our 
self-understanding, and hence our form of life--a far from unknown process in history); 
or it might show both to be so."18 
 
As I said in the introductory remark, he proclaims that this notion of "a 
language of perspicuous contrast" is very close to the Gadamer's "fusion of 
horizons." But are they really such close notions? If so, then in what respects?  
Unfortunately, we have to give up on finding an accurate explication of the 
relationship between these notions, because Taylor himself doesn't clarify it 
anywhere. But at least we can guess it from his descriptions of the "language of 
perspicuous contrast". Taylor takes up the case of understanding magical practice 
in a primitive society as an example, and applies the language of perspicuous 
contrast to this case. There he says: 
 
"So the hypothesis I put forward is that the way to understand the magical practices of 
some primitive societies might be to see them not through the disjunction, either 
proto-technology [like naturalist view] or expressive activity [like Winch's view], but 
                                                
18 UE, p. 126. 
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rather as partaking of a mode of activity in which this kind of clear separation and 
segregation is not yet made. Now identifying these two possibilities -- respectively, the 
fusion and the segregation of the cognitive or manipulative on the one hand, and the 
symbolic or integrative on the other hand -- amounts to finding a language of perspicuous 
contrast."19 
 
In the above case of understanding magical practices, what is supposedly separated 
but in fact attains the fusion is "the way to understand the magical practices", that 
is, to see the magical practices as proto-technology on the one hand, and to see 
them as expressive activity on the other hand. From here we can guess that 
language is analogous to prejudice or horizon. And in the former quotation, Taylor 
thinks that it is "their way of life and ours as alternative possibilities" that we can 
formulate in this language. So perhaps our way of life and other cultures' ways of 
life are analogous to the subject matter which texts imply and which we try to 
understand. 
If these estimations are correct, it is true that we can find many similarities 
between understanding old texts in hermeneutics and understanding different 
cultures in Taylor's view. Both Gadamer and Taylor deny the understanding only in 
terms of our own prejudices or our own language. And both of them deny an 
attempt at understanding purely in terms of the prejudices in the text's age or the 
language used in different cultures. If so, we are allowed to assume the similarities 
                                                
19 UE, pp. 128-9. 
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in the process of gaining understanding. Both of the objects of understanding -- 
historical texts and the ways of life in different cultures -- are so strange to us that 
we cannot easily understand them. And we cannot attain understanding unless we 
become aware of the particularity of our own prejudices or our own language. So 
in both cases such strangeness will induce us to go beyond our own prejudices or 
our own language. 
But we can also find dissimilarity if we make a detailed inspection of the 
process of understanding in both cases. As already mentioned, Gadamer thinks that 
the "fore-understanding which comes from being concerned with the same subject" 
is "the most basic of all hermeneutic preconditions" for understanding. And when it 
comes to understanding old texts, the tradition assures us of this fore-understanding, 
since we can acquire some bond to the subject matter as long as we belong to the 
same tradition as the text. 
But when it comes to understanding different cultures, to get such 
fore-understanding seems to be a difficult task because we are not separated from 
different cultures by temporal distance but by cultural distance. While the tradition 
gives us familiarity with texts, there seems to be no alternative to the tradition 
which gives us familiarity with different cultures. And if that is the case, 
cross-cultural studies must seek for this alternative in order to attain understanding. 
Actually, Taylor suggests a possible alternative for cross-cultural studies. In 
the former quotation cited above, he says that a language of perspicuous contrast is 
the one "in which we could formulate both their way of life and ours as alternative 
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possibilities in relation to some human constants at work in both." And Taylor 
thinks of these human constants as "birth, death, marriage, drought, plenty, etc"20. I 
guess that these "some human constants at work in both" are supposed to be the 
base of the required familiarity with different cultures, though Taylor doesn't claim 
it explicitly. 
Although we cannot ascertain that this supposition is what Taylor has in mind, 
at least we can justify this supposition. Taylor claims that cultural practices are the 
embodiment of the agents' way of life, that is, the way in which they face the 
human constants. And he goes on to claim that we cannot understand these 
practices until we take into account this way of life. I think, however, even though 
we admit this interpretivist view of understanding, it does not exclude the 
possibility that we perceive the human constants operating in the observed 
practices. 
Suppose we are investigating a magical practice in a primitive society. In 
order to understand the practice, according to the interpretivist view, we have to 
clarify what it means to the agents. But at least we can answer the following 
question without any recourse to interpretation: that is, what kind of human 
constants are concerned in this practice; or, to what human constants do the agents 
respond when they are engaged in this practice? For example, by observations we 
can know that this practice takes place in the presence of drought, even though we 
don't know what this practice means to the agents. To understand why the practice 
                                                
20 UE, p. 127. 
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takes place (e.g., whether it is proto-technology to bring on rain, or it has a 
symbolic function to recover the sense of integration in danger of the society) is 
one thing, but to know what is concerned in the practice is another. 
Thus I think it is by no means impossible for us to acquire some bond to 
cultural practices in different cultures to the extent that we share the human 
constants with those cultures. But to what extent we can share the human constants 
depends on what kind of human constant is concerned in the investigated practices. 
When it comes to the human constants of biological phenomena (e.g., birth and 
death) and those of natural phenomena (e.g., drought), perhaps we can manage to 
identify them without loss of content21. And when it comes to those of a somewhat 
cultural affair (e.g., marriage), more or less interpretation is indispensable to the 
identification. But if we can manage to acquire some bond to a practice, we can 
construct an anticipation of meaning of the practice, and we can advance toward 
understanding on the basis of this anticipation. Even if there are some 
misidentifications of the human constants, it may be possible that the 
misidentifications are corrected in the subsequent interpretation of the whole 
meaning of the practice. 
                                                
21It might be said that we cannot define even the human constants of biological phenomena such 
as "death", for there are hard cases like "brain death." It seems to be a difficult problem for our 
understanding, but we must be aware that all we need is some particular definition to identify the 
phenomenon which is concerned in the investigated practice. If we can set up a particular 
definition suitable for identifying, any kinds of definitions will go. For example, if we could 
identify the phenomenon with brain death by observation (e.g., medical diagnosis), it would be 
enough to advance toward understanding. Whether brain death is "death" or not is beside the 
question here. Indeed, why can you ask such question if you don't identify "brain death" with 
some definite phenomenon? 
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So it seems possible for us to try to attain a fusion of horizons in cross-cultural 
studies, in spite of the absence of tradition. And the human constants seem to be a 
good alternative to the tradition. But then, can we be satisfied with Taylor's 
proposal in all respects? I don't think so. I think Taylor is not conscious of a danger 
that his argument about understanding can also fall easily into ethnocentrism, and 
this is a harmful consequence of Taylor's ignoring the significance of temporality 
in hermeneutic understanding. 
When we try to understand something, we must take care not to understand it 
only in terms of our own prejudices, or only in terms of the prejudices of the author 
and agent. This is one of the important messages in Gadamer's hermeneutics. And 
Taylor certainly adheres to this message. Taylor's original enemy is arrogant 
naturalists, who assume that we can understand cultural practices only in terms of 
natural science, and who neglect the self-description of the agents in the practices 
altogether. In hermeneutic understanding, including Taylor's view, to understand is 
to reach an agreement on meaning between two different parties. What is required 
in hermeneutics is not one-sided understanding in terms of our own criteria or 
theirs, but mutual understanding which we can attain through dialogue-like 
interpretation. 
But hermeneutics also includes an ethnocentric moment in itself. Here we are 
reminded that hermeneutic understanding presupposes a unity of meaning, which is 
called "the fore-conception of completeness" by Gadamer. We must proceed to 
understanding on the supposition that a text constitutes a unity of meaning and that 
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what the author says must be the complete truth. In other words, we must proceed 
to understanding as if there were fixed meaning that we could share with the author, 
speaker, or agent. There are, nevertheless, no explicit criteria of distinguishing true 
interpretations from the false ones, other than the fact that the author (speaker, 
agent) and we have reached an agreement on meaning through the "fusion of 
horizons". 
But then, we can rightly ask what makes us possible to reach the agreement 
between the author (speaker, agent) and us. In the case of understanding historical 
texts, the clue to the agreement is the "history of effect" (Wirkungsgeschichte). 
According to Gadamer, "historical interest is directed not only toward the historical 
phenomenon and the traditionary work but also, secondarily, toward their effect in 
history (which also includes the history of research)"22. And when we try to 
understand a historical text, there has already been a cumulation of the effects of 
the historical text, and our interests and interpretation are affected by this 
cumulation. Gadamer says "if we are trying to understand a historical phenomenon 
from the historical distance that is characteristic of our hermeneutical situation, we 
are always already affected by history [of effect]. It determines in advance both 
what seems to us worth inquiring about and what will appear as an object of 
investigation"23. 
By contrast, Taylor doesn't assure us of the alternative to the history of effect. 
                                                
22 TM, p. 300 [WM, p. 305]. 
23 TM, p. 300 [WM, p. 305-6]. 
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And so in order to rescue the Taylor’s position, we have to ask ourselves whether 
we can reach the agreement even when we try to understand a cultural practice in 
different society. For example, suppose we converse with others in order to 
understand a particular cultural value of their society. Without political or 
economic forces operating in this conversation, we can continue until we get to a 
sincere agreement on its meaning. And suppose we haven't got to the agreement yet. 
Then why on earth don't we reach the agreement? What shall we do next in order to 
reach the agreement? From the hermeneutic point of view, the answers are no more 
than that we have failed to reach the agreement and that we cannot help but 
continue this conversation in the hope of that if we tried further, we could reach the 
agreement at last. Evidently these answers are far from satisfying. 
Thus I think Taylor failed to apply successfully hermeneutics to cross-cultural 
studies as a consequence of his ignoring the significance of the temporal distance 
in Gadamer's hermeneutics. And so if Taylor wants to claim that we can apply 
hermeneutics to cross-cultural studies, he has to find a complete alternative to the 
tradition. In my opinion, which I cannot develop here, if the interactions between 
cultures (commerce, war, immigration, emigration, etc.) last long enough to form a 
tradition of interactions, this tradition of interactions might become the clue to 




In this paper I have outlined Gadamer's hermeneutics and pointed out that 
temporality or the tradition played a crucial part in the process of hermeneutic 
understanding. Then I explained how the idea of hermeneutics was applied by 
Taylor to cross-cultural studies and to what extent his project is doomed to failure. 
It is true that both understanding the traditional texts and understanding different 
cultures must share such common hermeneutic aim as "establishing agreement 
where there was none or where it had been disturbed", and so I admit that 
hermeneutic understanding can surely be a clue to finding a way to 
non-ethnocentric understanding. But as long as Taylor greatly owes his own view 
to the Gadamer's hermeneutics, it remains a difficult problem in practice to gain 
some complete alternative to the tradition. If we want to rescue the Taylor’s view 
of cross-cultural understanding from this predicament, we have to refine the 
hermeneutic process of understanding more in detail than Taylor does. 
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